announce decision in Hudson v. Michigan, 3 the Ankeny majority held that suppression at trial is never an appropriate remedy in the unusual cases where police carry out otherwise legal searches or seizures in an unreasonable manner. The reason, the court explained, is that the manner in which a search is conducted is not the but-for cause of any evidence ultimately obtained. This Comment supports Ankeny's outcome on different grounds. Instead of relying on causation analysis borrowed from Hudson, courts should develop arguments from restorative justice and deterrence to distinguish between scope-and manner-based Fourth Amendment violations. Further, courts should encourage responsible planning of law enforcement operations by finding liability when police fail to take reasonable steps to avoid risks to private persons and their property.
I. THE PROBLEM WITH ANKENY
Ankeny relies on the Supreme Court's first holding in Hudson v. Michigan. Both opinions assert that suppression is an inappropriate remedy when the police "would have discovered" the evidence regardless of whether they committed the constitutional violation. 4 In Hudson, the Court deployed this principle to hold that suppression was uncalled for because the knock-andannounce violation in that case was not a "but-for cause of obtaining the evidence." ' Even if the police had knocked and announced themselves, the Court held, "the police would [still] have executed the warrant they had obtained" and thereby discovered the same evidence. 6 Similarly, Ankeny held that the police "would have" found the incriminating weapons " [e] ven without the use of a flash-bang device, rubber bullets, or any of the other methods that Defendant challenges." '7 Ankeny summed up its counterfactual analysis by holding that "the discovery of the guns was not causally related to the manner of executing the search." 8 Although Hudson portrays its causation analysis in familiar "but-for" terms, the Fourth Amendment principle it asserts -and that Ankeny actualizes -is actually quite novel. Normally, illegally obtained evidence can be admitted if legally relevant intervening causes, such as voluntary choices, interrupt the causal connection between an illegal search and the acquisition of evidence. 9 But Ankeny did not involve such an attenuated causal link, as the police's entry and search led immediately to the evidence's discovery. Drawing on another exception to the exclusionary rule and on Seventh Circuit case law,' 0 the district court in Ankeny held that the evidence at issue would inevitably have been discovered through "routine" police procedures." This view, though consistent with the causality analysis ultimately offered in Hudson, was not supported by the Court's pre-Hudson inevitable discovery jurisprudence. In prior cases, the Court required a showing that, in the absence of the illegal search, a later and "wholly independent" legal search would have discovered the same evidence. 2 In Hudson and Ankeny, by contrast, there was no reason to think that a separate legal search was in the offing. And, of course, the mere possibility that a routine, legal search in principle could have occurred does not suffice to show that such a search was inevitable.' 3 What makes Ankeny's causality analysis and the district court's approach to inevitable discovery problematic is their potential to disrupt a wide range of existing Fourth Amendment precedent. True, the police necessarily had to enter Ankeny's residence to discover the incriminating evidence therein, whereas the illegal aspects or features of the police's actual entry were not similarly necessary. In that sense, the manner of entry was indeed less causally essential to the discovery than the fact of entry. But there are many situations in which suppression is customarily required even though the constitutional violation at issue could have been avoided or would have been avoided if the police had simply employed routine procedures. As Judge Reinhardt and 
Additional prohibitions on uses of force constituting coercive and other interrogations
emanate from suspects' rights to due process and counsel and against self-incrimination. is. Not every violation of the warrant requirement constitutes a scope violation. For example, New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 20 (199o), declined to suppress incriminating statements made after an in-house arrest without a warrant, holding that the warrant requirement for in-house arrests protects only the integrity of the home and not the liberty of its occupants.
Id. In other words, while the police lacked legal authority to search Harris's house, they did 
25.
On the restorative approach, the ultimate acquisition of investigative authority can cure scope violations. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 443 (explaining that the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule "ensures that the prosecution is not put in a worse position simply because of some earlier police error or misconduct"). But see Segura v. United States, 468 disgorges the police of this unlawful evidentiary advantage, at least vis-A-vis the violated suspect.2 6 By contrast, suppression in response to manner violations deprives the police of evidence to which they had a legal right. Imagine a lawful search incident to arrest in which the officer unlawfully shoves a suspect to the ground. Even if the shove caused incriminating evidence to slip out of the suspect's pocket-and even if that evidence would have been overlooked but for the shove-the officer would not have obtained any forbidden information or accrued an illegal prosecutorial advantage. True, the suspect may have endured serious physical and dignitary harms, but those injuries can be remedied-and, in our legal system, normally are remediedthrough money damages alone. 27 Second, suppression lacks a special deterrent value in connection with manner as opposed to scope violations. Absent a suppression threat, investigators might be tempted to skirt constitutional niceties when their paramount goal is to obtain a criminal conviction, whatever the cost. Suppression for scope violations specially deters such operations in that it removes the unique incentive to break the law in order to obtain incriminating evidence.2 8 But manner violations, which occur when police collect evidence that lies within their investigative authority, are unlikely to be motivated by the desire to collect otherwise unattainable evidence, or even by the desire to collect evidence at all. Thus, the impetus for engaging in manner violations is divorced from any evidence ultimately obtained, and the deterrent effect of suppressing such evidence stems entirely from the ex post costs it imposes on police. Civil damages are (at least in principle) capable of replicating this general deterrent effect. Indeed, civil liability is an especially potent deterrent U.S. 796, 815 (1984) (justifying the very similar independent source exception to the exclusionary rule in terms of but-for causation). potentially doctrine-clarifying suits are never filed in the first place. Even Hudson evinced concern that qualified immunity might leave Fourth Amendment rights underenforced. 6 Nevertheless, manner-based suits are being filed, favorable judgments are sometimes obtained, and increasingly clear case law is being developed. To foster this progress, courts reviewing alleged manner violations should be especially attentive to the normal rule that qualified immunity can be lost even if there is no case law directly on point.
See
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Ill. THE INJURY-AVOIDANCE RULE
Denying the suppression remedy does not make manner violations any less important. On the contrary, taking suppression off the table may render judges more willing to find manner violations in the first place -and not just because courts may sometimes overlook Fourth Amendment violations in order to avoid having to impose the exclusionary rule.
8 Because current doctrine does not clearly differentiate between scope and manner rules, courts sometimes weigh the fact that the police acted within their investigatory authority against the potentially improper manner in which they executed that authority. 3 9 In other words, courts cite the lack of a scope violation as evidence that there was no manner violation, either. Ankeny itself exhibits this move, as the court notes under its "Manner of Entry" analysis that "the search did not exceed the scope of the warrant, which weighs in favor of a conclusion of reasonableness." 4 " Yet a search can be "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment either because of 36. See Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2167 (2006) (noting that civil suits are a fitting response to knock-and-announce violations in part because "the lower courts are allowing colorable knock-and-announce suits to go forward, unimpeded by assertions of qualified immunity"). its scope or because of its manner of execution (or both).4 Courts should respect these distinct sources of unconstitutionality by analyzing them independently.
37.
The Supreme Court's main statement on manner violations is the axiomatic precept that judges must weigh "the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake." 42 Applying this rule, Tennessee v. Garner held that the need to detain fleeing suspects does not justify shooting such suspects in the back. 43 The Court's analysis is akin to the cost-benefit analyses common in tort law, but with an important difference: whereas the "nature and quality" test is concerned only with the net effects of an actual police action, tort law is also concerned with the efficiency of potential precautionary measures. 4 For example, a company whose products yield more injury than benefit would plainly be liable under a tort-law analogue to the "nature and quality" rule. But tort law would also find liability if a company failed to install a precautionary device whose social benefits would have exceeded its price. Thus, viewing manner violations in light of tort law suggests that the existing "nature and quality" test should be complemented by subtler and potentially more demanding liability rules.
As a starting point, courts should adopt a general rule of injury avoidance: when the police have control over the time and place of executing a given search, the Fourth Amendment requires that they take reasonable steps to minimize risks and injuries to private persons and their property. When evaluating police efforts at reasonable injury-avoidance, courts might assess the likelihood that suspects are guilty and dangerous, and place a premium on the interests of nonsuspects. The rule avoids several potential pitfalls. First, it recognizes both that normal police operations involve reasonable risks and also that the police must be decisive when reacting to exigent circumstances. 
CONCLUSION
Ankeny affords an ideal case for judges and juries to apply the injury avoidance rule, as the police postponed and planned their search of Ankeny's residence for well over a month. The police intent on arresting Ankeny knew that he was a convicted and wanted felon and had good reason to believe that he was armed, prone to violence, and residing with a prison associate.
5 ' The police therefore had the legal right to enter Ankeny's home and determine whether or not he was in possession of firearms. Accordingly, no evidence resulting from this search should be suppressed. On the other hand, the police also knew that there was no exigency compelling quick arrest, that innocent bystanders (including an infant and a pregnant woman) shared Ankeny's residence, and that their planned manner of entry-particularly the indiscriminate use of flash-bang grenades and rubber bullets-posed serious risks to the inhabitants' persons and property."' Although the police did consider some alternatives, the Ankeny majority concluded that, based on the record available on appeal, " [ Si.
Id.
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and available measures to reduce the risk of injury." 5 2 Whether these facts ultimately vindicate the extraordinary operation reviewed in Ankeny is, as the court suggests, a "close" question. s3 But it is one that a civil suit for damages is capable of answering, through an adversarial inquiry into the alternative tactical opportunities available and the police's reasons for rejecting them. 
